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TORTS
By GREGORY K. JENKINS* AND RONALD L. GREEN**
During the past survey year1 the Kentucky judiciary ren-
dered a number of decisions relating to tort law.2 The primary
subject of this survey is major developments in product liabil-
ity theory, with emphasis on design defects and manufactur-
ers' duty to warn. Additionally, two significant cases concern-
ing contributory negligence are discussed.
* Partner in the firm of Boehi, Stopher, Graves & Deindoerfer, Lexington, Louis-
ville and Paducah, Kentucky, at Lexington office. J.D. 1976, University of Kentucky.
** Associate in the firm of Boehl, Stopher, Graves & Deindoerfer, Lexington,
Louisville and Paducah, Kentucky, at Lexington office. J.D. 1980, University of
Kentucky.
' The survey year commenced on July 1, 1979, and extended through June 3,
1980.
2 Other cases of interest decided this survey year but not considered in the text
are: Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980)(voluntary abortion did not break
causal link for negligence that caused injury to fetus)(exposure of pregnant women to
x-rays was sufficient contact on which to base damages for mental anguish); Gussler
v. Damron, 599 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980)(failure to obtain security as required
by no-fault act does not bar action in tort if such action could be brought by a se-
cured person); Bonnie Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson, 598 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980) (filing of lis pendens is not a judicial proceeding within the meaning of the tort
of abuse of process)(special damage is an essential element of slander of title); Stin-
nett v. Buchele, 598 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980)(a violation of Occupational
Health and Safety Act does not create a civil cause of action); Helton v. Montgomery,
595 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980)(jury should determine whether driver of pick-up
truck was liable for death of child who fell out of back, where driver did not know of
child's presence in truck but was aware of children in vicinity of truck prior to em-
barking); Riney v. Wray, 594 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980)(person who voluntarily
assumed duty of holding ladder was not liable for ceasing to hold it where there was
sufficient time before fall for painter to realize no one was holding ladder); Williams
v. Central Concrete Inc., 599 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)(malice is not an essen-
tial element of abuse of process); Everman v. Miller, 597 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979)(no-fault statute applies only to accidents occurring after effective date of act);
Hargett v. Dodson, 597 S.W.2d 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)(insured has no cause of ac-
tion to extent that basic reparation benefits are paid or payable); Johnson v.
Cormney, 596 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)(action for deceit may be based on a
failure to disclose known material facts where the circumstances surrounding a trans-
action give rise to such an obligation); Helton v. Forest Park Baptist Church, 589
S.W.2d 217 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)(the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked
until it is shown that a particular instrumentality caused the injury); Browning v.
Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)(infidelity of spouse failed to support
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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I. RECENT PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES
The theory of manufacturers' liability for design defects
has been the subject of considerable interest and confusion.'
Various approaches exist throughout the country for deter-
mining the manufacturers' liability, and these differences in
analysis mainly arise from misconstructions of the term
"strict liability."'4
In Nichols v. Union Underwear Co.,5 the Kentucky Su-
preme Court became embroiled in this confusion. In defining
"unreasonably dangerous,"' the Court abandoned the applica-
s Much has been written in the last year concerning design defect. See generally
Symposium-Current Developments in the Law of Torts, 33 VAND. L. REV. 549
(1980); Note, Products Liability: Motorcycle Design-The Outer Limits of
Crashworthiness, 9 STETSON L. REV. 406 (1980); Note, Seller's Liability for Defective
Design-The Measure of Responsibility, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 237 (1980); Com-
ment, Determining Liability for Design Defects: Arizona's Dichotomized Approach,
22 ARIz. L. REV. 339 (1980); Comment, The Failure to Warn Defect After Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co.: Preservation of the Limited Duty and Demise of the Knowl-
edge Requirement Defense, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 309 (1980).
4 "The liability stated in this Section [strict liability] does not rest upon negli-
gence." RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965). This statement
has led a number of courts to take the term "strict liability" literally, thereby dis-
counting principles of risk allocation generally associated with negligence. For exam-
ple, some courts have refused to use the term "unreasonably dangerous" because it
"rings of negligence." Cronin v. J.B.T. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972). But
see Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30
(1973).
Unfortunately, space does not permit an extensive discussion of this serious
problem. However, until all courts recognize that a manufacturer's liability in most
respects is based upon negligence principles, it will continue to be true that the
"orderly flow of development has turned into a swampy quagmire and threatens to
split into several different streams with diverse destinations." Wade, On Product
"Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 557 (1980).
5 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980). For another discussion of the Nichols case, see
Comment, Nichols v. Union Underwear, Inc. and the Meaning of "Unreasonably
Dangerous": A Call for a More Precise Standard, 69 Ky. L.J. 409 (1981).
6 In 1965 the Kentucky Court adopted what has inappropriately been called
strict liability in Dealers Transport Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky.
1965). Therein the Court adopted the position taken by the American Law Institute
in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), which provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
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tion of warranty theory to manufacturers' liability for design
defects. 7 In McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp,8 the Court
considered the question of a manufacturer's liability where
the buyer had designed the product, and held that except in
extraordinary situations, imposition of such liability would be
unfair. In Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Bloyd,9 the Court discussed
the manufacturer's "duty to warn" and considered the effect
of the user's negligence on a bystander's cause of action.
A. Nichols v. Union Underwear Co.:10 Defective and Unrea-
sonably Dangerous
Nichols held that a plaintiff in Kentucky must continue
to prove that a product is unreasonably dangerous, a require-
ment that at least two jurisdictions have abandoned.11 Conse-
quently, the Court addressed the meaning of "unreasonably
dangerous" and determined how that meaning should be con-
veyed to the jury.
1. The Concept of "Unreasonably Dangerous"
In Nichols the trial judge had included in his instructions
to the jury a definition of "unreasonably dangerous." If the
product was "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by an ordinary adult purchaser . . .
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
7 See text accompanying notes 19-20 & 76-89 infra for a discussion of the role of
contract law in the product liability area.
8 594 S.W.2d 595 (Ky. 1980).
586 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. 1979). This case was decided prior to the survey period but
was not treated in the last survey issue.
10 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980).
" Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Butaud v. Subur-
ban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972). Despite California's abandonment of the "unreason-
ably dangerous" requirement in Cronin, a recent decision indicates that the basis for
liability remains the same. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
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with ordinary knowledge as to its inherent characteristics,"12
the jury was instructed to find for the plaintiff. The product
at issue was a four-year-old child's T-shirt that caught fire
while the child was playing with matches. The jury returned a
verdict for the manufacturer; the plaintiff appealed, attacking
the trial court's definition of "unreasonably dangerous."' 3
Since there clearly was sufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding under the instruction, 4 the Supreme Court of
Kentucky found it necessary to review the meaning of "unrea-
sonably dangerous."
In reaching its decision, the Kentucky Court had to de-
cide whether a product's "patent danger" necessarily insu-
lated a manufacturer from liability. 5 If a product is "no more
dangerous than would be anticipated by the ordinary per-
son,"'16 should a jury nonetheless be allowed to consider the
reasonableness of the risk the product creates? While numer-
12 602 S.W.2d at 432.
" The trial court's instruction was based upon a definition offered by the Re-
statement: "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965).
14 602 S.W.2d at 430.
" The Court also struggled with the distinction between strict liability and negli-
gence in the design defect context. Justice Stephens stated: "In every case, however,
the golden thread that holds the rule together is [402A]," 602 S.W.2d at 431, but said
"that this 'knowledge' [the seller is presumed to have knowledge of the condition of
the product when it leaves his hands] characteristic is not as significant in design
defect cases as in manufacturing defect cases." Id. at 433. In contrast consider the
following:
The fact that this bears a remarkable resemblance to negligence suggests
only that perhaps principles of strict tort liability, which are suitable for
defining the liability of a manufacturer in the production phase of his oper-
ations, may not be suitable for defining the defendant's duties in the design
and marketing operations. This may also suggest that traditional concepts
of negligence may be the proper measure of a manufacturer's responsibility
in those areas, and that § 402A of the Restatement, Second, Torts was not
intended to supersede § 398, "Chattel Made Under Dangerous Plan or
Design."
W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 83-84 (1979). This confusion has not
been confined to Kentucky. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect:
From Negligence to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980).
16 602 S.W.2d at 432.
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ous states say no, 17 the Nichols Court noted a strong move-
ment to a tort-oriented approach.' 8 While consumer expecta-
tion, i.e., whether the consumer received the benefit of his
bargain, is the prime consideration in a contract action,' 9 tort
law is premised on the allocation of responsibility for risk.20
Consumer expectation therefore cannot serve as an absolute
defense. For a manufacturer to be liable for personal injury or
property loss under tort theory, however, the logical basis for
that liability must be the creation of an unreasonable risk.
The Nichols Court accepted this logic and held that for liabil-
ity to be imposed upon a manufacturer, the plaintiff must es-
tablish that the product posed an unreasonable risk.
2. Factors to be Considered
The Nichols Court did not enumerate all factors that
might be significant in determining whether an unreasonable
risk exists. The Court noted, however, that such factors might
include knowledge of the ordinary consumer, obviousness of
the danger and the presence or absence of a warning.
21
Justice Lukowsky, concurring,22 agreed fully with the
analysis of Justice Stephens, writing for the majority. He
stated, however, that the opinion should "identify the gut
issue:"
The bottom line is that the trier of fact is required to bal-
ance two pairs of factors existing at the time of manufac-
ture: (1) the likelihood that the product would cause the
claimants harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of
those harms; against (2) the manufacturer's burden of de-
signing a product that would have prevented those harms,
'1 The Court said 17 states follow this rule. Id.
Is Id.
19 See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 829 (1973). See also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 206
(1970).
20 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 145 (4th ed. 1971).
21 602 S.W.2d at 433. The Court also referred the reader to Fischer, Products
Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974); Phillips, The Stan-
dard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 101
(1977); and Wade, supra note 19, at 825, for further factors that might be considered.
22 602 S.W.2d at 434 (Lukowsky, J., concurring).
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and the adverse effect that alternative design would have on
the usefulness of the product. That is to say that the manu-
facturer is not liable unless at the time of manufacture the
magnitude of the danger to the claimant outweighed the
utility of the product to the public .... The ultimate in-
quiry is risk versus benefit.2 3
Both opinions reach the same conclusion, but the major-
ity position requires the consideration of several factors, while
the concurring position isolates only two. Closer inspection,
however, reveals that each of the factors referred to by the
majority would be considered in a weighing of the two factors
isolated by the concurring position, because each has some
bearing on either risk or benefit. 4
3. Instructing the Jury
The primary distinction between the majority and con-
curring opinions in Nichols is in the language suggested to
guide the jury in making the correct decision. Justice Ste-
phens proposed:
You will find for the plaintiff only if you are satisfied from
23 Id.
2 Wade, supra note 19, at 837-38, lists the following factors as significant:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause in-
jury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of
the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product
and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious
condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or
instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Factors (1) through (6) clearly have a bearing on either risk or benefit. Factor (7)
reflects the view that the risk should be transferred to the party most able to bear the
loss.
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the evidence that the material of which the T-shirt was
made created such a risk of its being accidentally set on fire
by a child wearing it that an ordinarily prudent company
engaged in the manufacture of clothing, being fully aware of
the risk, would not have put it on the market; otherwise you
will find for the defendant.
25
Justice Lukowsky offered the following alternative:
You will find for the plaintiff if you are satisfied from the
evidence that at the time of the manufacture of the cotton
and polyester T-shirt the risk of harm from its being acci-
dentally set on fire while being worn by a child outweighed
the benefit to the public from its availability in the market-
place. Otherwise you will find for the defendant.
26
The majority instruction reflects to some extent one of-
fered by Dean Wade. Under Stephens' instruction, the jury
would be told that the manufacturer is presumed to be "fully
aware of the risk." The manufacturer, under that rule, would
be nothing less than an insurer. The law does not hold the
manufacturer to full knowledge of all risks, but rather im-
putes to him knowledge of the condition of his product.2 This
is why the rule is "not as significant in design defect cases as
in manufacturing defect cases. ' 29 It should be noted that
Dean Wade's suggestion read "had actual knowledge of its
harmful character." 30 In short, there is no support in the law
for holding a manufacturer to the knowledge of all risks which
may attend themselves to use of the product.
Both instructions refer ultimately to the same test but
2' 602 S.W.2d at 433.
26 Id. at 434 (Lukowsky, J., concurring).
2 7 Wade, supra note 19, at 839-40.
2' Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976). See also Po-
land v. Beaird-Poulan, 483 F. Supp. 1256 (W.D. La. 1980); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978); Reiger v. Toby Enterprises, 609 P.2d 402 (Or. Ct.
App. 1980).
29 602 S.W.2d at 433. In the design defect case, the manufacturer has generally
chosen the characteristic that is alleged to be defective and thus has actual knowl-
edge. A manufacturing defect, on the other hand, often cannot be discovered even
with reasonable inspection and thus recovery often hinges on this presumption of
knowledge. In both cases a plaintiff must show that an ordinarily prudent manufac-
turer would have appreciated the risk created by the condition of the product.
30 Wade, supra note 19, at 840.
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differ in orientation. The majority instruction fails to convey
to the jury the ultimate determination that it is asked to
make-that of risk versus benefit.3 ' Assuming the jury to
know what an "ordinarily prudent company" is, the instruc-
tion only impliedly asks the jury to weigh risk against
benefit.
32
In contrast, the instruction offered by Justice Lukowsky
focuses the jury's attention on the risk versus benefit issue.
The instruction clearly outlines the jury's task, which is to
weigh the factors germane to risk and benefit based on evi-
dence introduced at trial.
33
4. Effect of Federal Standards
The T-shirt in Nichols apparently complied with federal
3 To the extent that the instruction suggested by the majority in Nichols will
likely be changed by the Court in the future, a trial judge presented with a similar
case is in an obvious dilemma. The giving of a different instruction may result in a
retrial, because it might be improper to give an instruction that conflicts with a Su-
preme Court opinion. The resolution of this problem is suggested by Penker Constr.
Co. v. Finley, 485 S.W.2d 244, 250 (Ky. 1972), in which the Court stated that the
failure to define unreasonably dangerous is not reversible error. Until the Court has a
chance to review the Nichols instruction, the best course may be to avoid the issue.
32 In the typical negligence case the jury would be instructed as to the defen-
dant's duty to exercise ordinary care. See, e.g., J. PALMORE, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES §
23.01 (1977). Ordinary care is then separately defined to mean "such care as an ordi-
narily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances." Id. at 30. Implicit
in the definition is the risk versus benefit analysis. W. PROSSER, supra note 20, at 145-
49.
" Dean Wade made clear that the factors were not to be given to the jury. Wade,
supra note 19, at 840. This discussion, of course, assumes that it is feasible for the
jury to make the risk versus benefit determination. The jury sees only two parties, the
manufacturer and the injured plaintiff, yet the public as a collective whole has a tre-
mendous interest in the outcome of the case. The decision may affect the choices
available to the public in the marketplace, product costs, and other considerations.
The Kentucky Court has on other occasions concluded that the role of the jury
should be to decide controverted factual theories while the role of the court is to
weigh the various policy considerations relevant to the question of whether to impose
liability. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1975); House
v. Kellerman, 519 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1974). See also Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141
(Ky. 1980). If an instance ever exists in which a jury is not suited to applying the
facts to the law, the issue of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous seems to
be it, as is evidenced by the call to handle the problem administratively. See Model
Uniform Product Liability Act, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62714 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as UPLA].
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safety standards.34 While the majority and concurring opin-
ions did not address the issue at all, Justice Stephenson's dis-
sent argued that the manufacturer was entitled to a directed
verdict because of compliance.35 Should the case come before
the Court on appeal from a second trial, it will likely be called
upon to decide the effect of such compliance.3"
In Nichols, Justice Stephens called to the legislature's at-
tention the existence of the Draft Uniform Product Liability
Law37 (UPLA), with an attendant urging of its adoption.3 8
The UPLA provides for a rebuttable presumption against de-
fectiveness if the federal standard complied with meets four
criteria: 1) that the standard is the result of thorough testing
and evaluation; 2) that consumer interests were considered; 3)
that it is considered to be more than a minimum safety stan-
dard; and 4) that the standard is technologically and scientifi-
cally "up-to-date." 39 The approach taken by the UPLA pro-
vides for the various interests at stake and reflects the
position of a majority of jurisdictions.
4"
B. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Bloyd:41 Failure to Warn
It is well settled that a manufacturer is liable for failure
to adequately warn of a product's dangers.42 In Bloyd the
manufacturer had produced a handgun resembling old west-
ern revolvers. When the fully-loaded weapon was dropped
from a height of eight to fifteen inches, it had a propensity to
fire. Alternative safety measures that would have rendered the
weapon safe when dropped from a height of twelve inches
were available to the manufacturer at a nominal cost. The
.4 602 S.W.2d at 434 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
I /d.
3' For a discussion of the effect of statutes and trade standards upon the manu-
facturers' liability, see R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
2D § 9:11 (2d ed. 1975).
37 UPLA, supra note 33.
38 602 S.W.2d at 432 n.1.
:9 UPLA, supra note 33, § 107.
40 See analysis accompanying UPLA, supra note 33, § 107.
41 586 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. 1979).
42 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 36, § 8:1; W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra
note 15, at 192-94.
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manufacturer justified the absence of these measures on the
grounds of style and marketability, 3 and the handgun was ac-
companied by instructions which, if followed, would prevent
the weapon from firing when dropped. The co-defendant pur-
chaser kept the fully-loaded weapon on the floor of his auto-
mobile. Plaintiff was shot in the ankle when, in the process of
washing the automobile, the gun fell to the concrete floor and
fired.
1. Theory Underlying the Failure to Warn Concept
For purposes of analysis, failure to warn44 cases may be
divided into three categories. The first category consists of
cases in which the design chosen is clearly deficient under the
risk versus benefit analysis, but the danger is converted to a
reasonable one by virtue of a warning.4 In these cases the fo-
cus is not solely upon the duty to warn; rather the existence of
a warning is one factor to be considered in determining
whether the design is unreasonably dangerous.46 The second
group consists of cases in which there is nothing "wrong" with
the product, but the product has particular characteristics
that when coupled with specific conduct of the user may cre-
ate an unreasonable risk or injury.47 Finally are the cases that
involve a design with a large degree of risk combined with an
overriding degree of social utility and are thus unavoidably
43 586 S.W.2d at 20.
44 Of course a manufacturer has no duty to warn of dangers not created or en-
hanced by the product. That the product is to be used in a dangerous activity does
not make the product unsafe.
45 This category contemplates a situation in which the manufacturer has a choice
between two designs, chooses the design that creates the greater risk, and because of
the absence of a corresponding increase in utility, the product is unreasonably dan-
gerous. Therefore, an adequate warning may have the effect of reducing the risk so
that in the final analysis, risk is outweighed by benefit.
46 See text accompanying note 21 supra for a discussion of a warning in this
context. 1
47 This category contemplates a situation in which the product is not unreasona-
bly dangerous, either because of low amount of risk or because of the lack of a safer
alternative. In such a case the risk is created by the coupling of some characteristic of
the product with some course of conduct, usually a misuse. If the conduct should
have been reasonably anticipated, then the manufacturer may have a duty to warn of
the increased risk incurred by such conduct. A classic example is Post v. American
Cleaning Equip. Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516 (1968).
[Vol. 69
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unsafe. While the design is not in any way defective, the man-
ufacturer has breached an independent duty by failing to
warn of the risk inherent in the product."8
The second category, consisting of cases where specific
conduct of the user renders an otherwise safe product unrea-
sonably dangerous, is the most frequently encountered.49 It is
into this second group that Bloyd falls. The Court appeared
to distinguish between the design defect and manufacturer's
duty to warn concepts and applied a negligence standard for
measuring the manufacturer's liability.50 In design defect
cases, a manufacturer's knowledge of the product's character-
istics is presumed, 51 but this presumption is not generally ex-
tended to failure to warn cases."2 A significant difference ex-
ists between requiring a manufacturer to be aware of the
characteristics of his chosen design and requiring him to an-
ticipate all possible conduct of the user. Thus, courts have
limited this duty to warn to conduct that is foreseeable 63 at
'8 This situation is specifically treated in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS §
402A, Comment k (1965). While liability is not imposed on a manufacturer for pro-
ducing such a product, the law does impose on him the duty to warn. The risk being
unavoidable, the warning in these cases does little more than allow a consumer to
make an informed choice.
4 For a listing of the advantages of basing a claim on this type theory, see W.
KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 15, at 193-94.
60 The criteria of liability by which the duty of a manufacturer is measured
are whether it knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care ought to have
known, that the equipment was limited in its safety design and that it
should foresee a substantial likelihood that a user, exercising ordinary care
for his own safety, might be injured by it. If so, the manufacturer is under a
duty either to use reasonable care to remedy the design before selling it so
that it is reasonably safe for its intended use and other uses which are rea-
sonably foreseeable or to provide such warning as would be reasonably suf-
ficient to bring the danger to an expectable user's attention and be under-
stood by him.
Id. at 21.
" See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra for a discussion of this point.
52 W. KiMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 15, at 198.
's The UPLA replaces the term "foreseeable" 'vith the term "reasonably antici-
pated conduct," which is defined in § 102(6) to be "conduct which would be expected
of an ordinary prudent person who is likely to use the product." The analysis to that
section explains the difference as follows:
The meaning of "reasonably anticipated" should be contrasted with "fore-
seeable." Almost any kind of misconduct with regard to products can be
foreseeable-especially if the trier of fact is permitted to use hindsight, e.g.,
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69
the time of manufacture,54 but the manufacturer is required
to exercise ordinary care in anticipating uses that may render
the product unreasonably dangerous.
2. To Whom Warning Must be Given
Generally, if a duty to warn exists, it must be extended to
all foreseeable55 users and consumers.5 This rule is subject to
exceptions, however, and the most prevalent ones are where
the employer buys a product for his employee's use 7 and
where a physician prescribes drugs for his patients.58 These
exceptions are based upon the premise that the product will
be used in a supervised context,5 9 with the buyer being in the
best position to give a warning.
Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 0 in 1975, settled the is-
sue of whether a manufacturer's liability for a defect extends
to injuries sustained by a bystander; in Embs, the Court al-
lowed the bystander to recover. No reference was made in
Bloyd to any duty to warn a bystander,61 and under the facts
that a soda bottle will be used for a hammer, that someone will attempt to
drive a land vehicle on water, that perfume will be poured on a candle in
order to scent it.
11 See W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 15, at 208-09. The Kentucky Court
has consistently used the language "reasonably anticipated" in this context. Ulrich v.
Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976).
" See note 53 supra for a discussion of the problem with the term "foreseeable."
06 See R. HuRSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 36, at 167-74.
'7 This exception was recognized in Bohnert Equip. Co. v. Kendall, 569 S.W.2d
161 (Ky. 1978):
Under the evidence in this case, we think the warning given to Kittel dis-
charged the manufacturer's and seller's responsibility if it was adequate
under the circumstances. The warning duty has been deemed satisfied
where warning was given to supervising engineers or technicians though not
to one who was injured while simply following the directions of such skilled
individuals.
Id. at 166. See, e.g., Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218 (Del. 1977); Reed v.
Pennwalt Corp., 591 P.2d 478 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
11 See, e.g., Haste v. American Home Products Corp., 577 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir.
1978); Hawkins v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 249 S.E.2d 286 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978). Cf.
Torsiello v. Whitehall Labs., 398 A.2d 132 (N.J. Super. 1979)(rule does not apply
where sold without prescription).
" Compare Bohnert Equip. Co. v. Kendall, 569 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1978) with Post
v. American Cleaning Equip. Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1970).
60 528 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1975).
62 The majority in Bloyd did not treat the issue. Chief Justice Palmore raised the
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therein, 2 it is difficult to conceive how the manufacturer
could have warned the plaintiff.
3. Effect of User's Failure to Heed Warning on
Bystander's Cause of Action
The central issue in Bloyd was the effect of the user's
failure to follow the manufacturer's instructions on a by-
stander's right to recovery.63 While the Court found such fail-
ure to be negligent, it based its decision absolving the manu-
facturer of liability upon the premise that the user's failure to
follow the instructions was conduct that could not reasonably
be anticipated. 4 The concurrence agreed, stating that there
was no duty to foresee the negligence of another.6 5 The dis-
sent argued that it was entirely foreseeable that instructions
would be ignored by the consumer and, additionally, that lia-
bility need not be based on a finding of foreseeability.6 6 The
three opinions differ primarily on what is foreseeable. The
majority and concurring opinions viewed the user's conduct as
an insulating event and thus never reached the question of
whether the product was unreasonably dangerous, while the
dissent argued that the manufacturer's reliance on the user to
follow the instructions was unreasonable and that the manu-
facturer should be held liable for choosing an unsafe design.
issue in his concurring opinion.
2 See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra for a discussion of the role of a
warning in such a case. The duty to warn in these situations seems to run only to
users, and in Bloyd a user warning had been given by the manufacturer.
'3 The effect of a user's failure to follow instructions where the user seeks recov-
ery was settled in Post v. American Cleaning Equip. Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Ky.
1970)(the user's "contributory negligence must be read in the light of the sufficiency
of the warning to apprise him of the severity, gravity and extent of the danger").
6 In the present case, there is no basis to conclude that the manufacturer
could reasonably be expected to anticipate that the revolver would be car-
ried loaded, stashed away under the floor mat of a car, and above all, when
the car was to be washed and cleaned that the person who owned the re-
volver would not tell the person doing the cleaning of the revolver's pres-
ence and dangerous propensity.
586 S.W.2d at 23.
15 Id. (Palmore, C.J., concurring).
66 Id. at 24 (Reed, J., dissenting).
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
a. Buyer's Failure to Heed Warning as a Superseding Event
In Kentucky, determination of foreseeability is a question
of law.6 7 Furthermore, another's negligence is superseding
only if "unforeseeable" and only if it is not the result of nor-
mal incidents of the risk. 8 The majority in Bloyd concluded
that a manufacturer who has given an adequate warning of a
product's dangers has the right to rely on the user to follow
those directions. The dissent, however, pointed out that in-
structions are often ignored and that the risk was created by
the design choice. Thus, the dissent reasoned that a warning
cannot insulate a manufacturer from liability to a bystander
where an unsafe design was chosen.
69
b. To Whom Manufacturer's Duty Runs
The basis for a manufacturer's possible liability to a by-
stander in a failure to warn case has never been specified by
the Kentucky Court. In design defect cases, liability is clearly
based on the creation of an unreasonable risk,70 with the by-
stander being within the scope of that risk. Where a warning
is given to render a defective design reasonably safe, an im-
plicit determination exists that the increased risk associated
with the chosen design outweighed its utility to society and
that there was a safer choice. The risk is decreased by the
issuance of a warning, but in the absence of a warning the
product is unreasonably dangerous.
Because a warning cannot generally be given to a by-
stander, the product could be found to be unreasonably dan-
gerous as to the bystander. Thus, the real issue is who a man-
ufacturer must consider when choosing a design. A tendency
in the law exists, based on contract principles, to treat a by-
stander differently than a user or consumer.71 Under tort the-
ory, however, a bystander's recovery should be premised on a
finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous as to
"' House v. Kellerman, 519 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1974).
6 W. PROSSER, supra note 20, at 281-86.
69 See note 45 supra for a discussion of this kind of warning.
70 Wade, supra note 4, at 557.
71 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1125-26 (1960).
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him, just as a user must prove unreasonable danger to himself
in order to recover. If the choice of design was not unreasona-
bly dangerous, no basis exists for holding the manufacturer
liable to a bystander.
Under this analysis, the holding in Bloyd could have bet-
ter rested on whether the choice of design was unreasonably
dangerous in the first instance. While the manufacturer chose
the more dangerous of available designs, the choice was not
unreasoned. The weapon "was emblematic of the western
guns and was highly successful on the market." 2 The Court
stated that a manufacturer "is not required to design the best
possible product or one as good as others make or a better
product than the one he has, so long as it is reasonably
safe. 7 3 Thus, in order to find a product unreasonably danger-
ous, it would have to appear that the risk of injury to a by-
stander is greater than the utility of the design choice. Under
this analysis, it was inadvisable for the Court to consider the
question of superseding cause without first determining
whether the product was unreasonably dangerous. If the de-
sign choice was not unreasonable, no basis exists for liability
to the bystander, regardless of any breach of duty to warn the
user. As urged by the dissent, the likelihood of the user's fail-
ure to follow instructions should be but one factor in deter-
mining the likelihood of bystander injury.7 4 The dissent's po-
sition, however, that a warning cannot insulate a
manufacturer from liability to a bystander where an unsafe
but not unreasonably dangerous design was chosen should not
be adopted. To do so would make a manufacturer an insurer
of bystanders' safety.
C. McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp:75 Manufacturer's Li-
ability for the Design of Another
In McCabe Powers Body Co., the manufacturer had not
chosen the design but had assembled the product in accor-
72 586 S.W.2d at 20.
73 Id. at 21-22.
" Id. at 24 (Reed, J., dissenting).
75 594 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1980).
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dance with the buyer's specifications. McCabe received a bid
from the state to construct an aerial boom, with the provision
that any deviation from specifications would be grounds for
rejection. The aerial boom was open on one side. In the course
of his employment with the Department of Highways, Sharp
lost consciousness and fell from the boom, sustaining perma-
nent injury.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's holding
that compliance with specifications absolved the manufacturer
of any liability for defective design. The Supreme Court rein-
stated the trial court's ruling, quoting from a Sixth Circuit
opinion:78 "To hold [the manufacturer] liable for defective de-
sign would amount to holding a nondesigner liable for design
defect."7
The Court stated that an exception to this rule would be
where the supplied plans "could contain design defects so ex-
traordinarily dangerous that a product manufacturer should
decline to produce or, if appropriate, issue warnings as to the
use of the product.' 78 This exception merely states the obvi-
ous, that a manufacturer may be held liable for negligence,
independent of product liability theory. The Court further
limited the rule to nonliability for defects obvious to the user,
reserving ruling on concealed defects.7 9
D. Viability of Implied Warranty
The debision in Nichols v. Union Underwear, Inc.80 was
clearly based upon tort principles. The question then arises
whether in Kentucky a consumer has a cause of action in con-
7" Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1974) (applying Ken-
tucky law).
'7 594 S.W.2d at 595. Does not this rationale apply with equal force to a retailer
or wholesaler? See Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.340 (Cum. Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
KRS].
"' 594 S.W.2d at 595.
79 Id. There is no reason for not extending the rule to concealed defects, as the
manufacturer's duty would remain the same. That the defect is concealed would,
however, have significant impact on the scope of the exception. The nature of the
defect has a direct bearing on the degree of danger, as well as on the duty to warn,
and thus should be a factor to consider in deciding whether to issue a warning or
decline to manufacture the product.
80 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980).
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tract as well.8 1 Sixteen years ago, in Dealer's Transport Co. v.
Battery Distributing Co.,82 the Court noted that contract law
was not an appropriate theory for product liability: "[T]he
pragmatic view impels us to recognize that recovery against a
remote vendor in this type of case, even when based on im-
plied warranty, truly sounds more in tort than in contract."83
In McMichael v. American Red Cross,84 the plaintiff
brought an action for damages arising from the sale of blood
containing hepatitis virus; the trial judge directed a verdict
for the defendant on the ground that there was no sale of
goods involved. The Court of Appeals affirmed but on the
ground that the product was unavoidably unsafe and there-
fore not unreasonably dangerous. This finding was held to bar
a claim under both tort and contract theories. The Court
stated:
We recognize that the concept of unavoidable unsafeness
was developed only as an exception to strict tort liability
under Section 402A as an interpretation of the term "unrea-
sonably dangerous" as used in that section, and has not in
terms been utilized by any court as a basis for an exception
to liability under the implied warranty of fitness provided
for in the Uniform Commercial Code. Nevertheless, we view
strict liability under Section 402A and implied warranty li-
ability under the Uniform Commercial Code as being ex-
pressions of a single basic public policy as to liability for
defective products. If the policy as to Section 402A is that
unavoidable unsafeness of the character involved in the
blood in the instant case is a basis for denying strict liabil-
ity, it would seem that the same policy should prevail with
respect to liability under implied warranty8 5
"1 No case has been decided on warranty theory since Dealers Transport Co. v.
Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965). The Kentucky Court has declined
comment on the distinction between tort and implied warranty theory in a number of
cases brought on both theories. Huffman v. S.S. Mary & Elizabeth Hosp., 475 S.W.2d
631, 633 (Ky. 1972); Briner v. General Motors Corp., 461 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Ky. 1970);
Holbrook v. Rose, 458 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Ky. 1970).
82 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965).
83 Id. at 446-47.
81 532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1975).
85 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
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McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp8 6 is the only case in
which implied warranty has been given any attention. The
Court stated that "[tihe Court of Appeals pointed out that
there was no contention that the aerial boom failed to operate
in the intended manner and properly rejected Sharp's asser-
tion of breach of implied warranty. '1 7 Thus, in Kentucky,
even if implied warranty theory has been retained, it has not
been applied in the contexts of failure to warn and absence of
safety devices.88
It is submitted that the Kentucky Court should express
what it has often implied-product liability should be
grounded in tort, not contract.8 9 Engrafting warranty theory
onto product liability only results in confusion.90 The General
80 594 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1980). See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra for a
discussion of this case.
87 Id. at 593.
See R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 36, § 8:29; W. KIMBLE & R. LESHE_,
supra note 15, at 203-04. It should be noted that in McCabe the plaintiff's contract
cause of action would have been barred by the horizontal privity requirement in KRS
§ 355.2-318 (1971).
8' "The time has now come to be forthright in.using a tort way of thinking and
tort terminology." Wade, supra note 19, at 834.
So The master in this area, the late Dean Prosser, defined this problem years ago
with great specificity and insight. He noted the courts had indulged in no less than 29
legal fictions to determine manufacturer's liability, and that:
[O]ut of this welter, the theory which finally emerged ... was that of an
implied "warranty"....
The adoption of this particular device was facilitated by the peculiar
and uncertain nature and character of warranty, a freak hybrid born of the
illicit intercourse of tort and contract. "A more notable example of legal
miscegenation could hardly be cited than that which produced the modem
action for breach of warranty. Originally sounding in tort, yet arising out of
the warrantor's consent to be bound, it later ceased necessarily to be con-
sensual, and at the same time came to lie mainly in contract."
Prosser, supra note 71, at 1125-26. After noting several disadvantages of contract the-
ory in this context, Dean Prosser continued:
What all of this adds up to is that "warranty," as a device for the justifica-
tion of strict liability to the consumer, carries for too much luggage in the
way of undesirable complications, and is leading us down a very thorny
path. . . .There is no need to borrow a concept from the contract law of
sales; and it is "only by some violent pounding and twisting" that "war-
ranty" can be made to serve the purpose at all. Why talk of it?
Id. at 1133. Some six years later, commenting on the impact of his astute observa-
tions, he wrote:
The effect of this decision [Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377
P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)] was immediate. Other courts at once agreed that the
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Assembly, in enacting the Product Liability Act of Ken-
tucky,9 1 did not distinguish between tort and contract theories
in a product liability action.2 The drafters of the UPLA have
also seen the wisdom of such an approach. 3
II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
In Kentucky a plaintiff may be denied recovery if his own
negligence contributed to his injury, even though he has
proven each element in his negligence cause of action. 4 The
Kentucky courts have recently decided several cases involving
contributory negligence, two of which are treated herein.
A. Safety Regulation as Basis for Liability
Breach of the standard of care imposed upon a defen-
dant 5 may often be proved by showing a violation of a safety-
oriented statute or regulation. In Lomayestewa v. Our Lady
of Mercy Hospital,97 the plaintiff was being treated in the de-
fendant hospital for grand mal epilepsy and emotional der-
angement. The hospital staff knew plaintiff to be in a violent
state and placed her in a "restraint-type vest."98 While unat-
proper theory was not one of warranty at all, but simply of strict liability in
tort divorced from any contract rules. . . .There are still courts which have
continued to talk the language of "warranty"; but the forty-year reign of
the word is ending, and it is passing quietly down the drain.
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 804 (1966).
91 KRS § 411.300 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
92 KRS § 411.300(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides: "[A] 'product liability action'
shall include any action brought for or on account of personal injury, death or prop-
erty damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, for-
mulation, development of standards, preparation, processing, assembly, testing, list-
ing, certifying, warning, instructing, marketing, advertising, packaging or labeling of
any product."
,3 UPLA, supra note 33, § 103(a).
SSee generally Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967).
95 The standard is that degree of care that would have been exercised by a rea-
sonably prudent person under the circumstances. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 150 (4th ed. 1971).
9' See Wagers v. Frantz, 445 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1969); see also Bennett v. Parkway
Professional Ctr., Inc., 507 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1974) (building code set higher standard
of care than common law).
589 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1979).
9" Id. at 886.
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tended, she released herself from the restraint and either fell
or jumped from the second floor of the hospital, sustaining
serious injuries. The defendant had failed to provide a deten-
tion screen over the window, as required by administrative
regulation. The trial judge submitted both the plaintiff's and
defendant's negligence to the jury, which returned a general
verdict for the defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but
the Supreme Court reversed, finding the hospital liable as a
matter of law.
As the Court had little difficulty finding the defendant
negligent based upon the violation of the safety regulation, its
decision focused on the contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff.99 Generally, the fact that the defendant's negligence is
premised on the violation of a statute or regulation does not
negate the availability of the defense of contributory negli-
gence. 100 It has long been recognized, however, that a specific
class of these protective measures could not be effective if
contributory negligence were a bar to recovery.101 Whether a
statute or regulation falls within this class is "a matter of the
legislative purpose which the Court finds in the statute." 102
In Lomayestewa the regulation imposed upon the defen-
dant the duty to protect the plaintiff from her own infirmity.
It is this aspect of the regulation that is crucial to a holding
that contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery.103
B. Medical History and Malpractice
In Mackey v. Greenview Hospital, Inc.,04 the plaintiff
was admitted to the defendant hospital for a breast biopsy, a
procedure requiring anesthetization. During surgery the plain-
tiff went into cardiac arrest. The physicians were unable to
restore normal heart function promptly, which resulted in
:" Id. at 887.
10 Bennett v. Parkway Professional Ctr., Inc., 507 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1974).
102 589 S.W.2d at 887.
102 Id.
103 The same theme may be found in the Child Labor cases referred to by the
Court, in that the purpose of a child labor statute is to protect children, whose age
and lack of appreciation of danger renders them unable to protect themselves from
occupational hazards. Louisville & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Lyons, 159 S.W. 971 (Ky. 1913).
104 587 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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massive brain damage. The plaintiff had a pre-existing heart
condition and had been taking the drugs Lasix and nitroglyc-
erin. The physicians' failure to know of these facts (and to
thus postpone surgery) was clearly the cause of the plaintiff's
brain damage. 10 5 Plaintiff contended that the defendant was
negligent in not learning of her medical history; defendant
contended that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in not re-
laying it. The jury found for the defendant, and the plaintiff
appealed.
A physician is negligent if he fails to "use that degree of
care and skill that is expected of a reasonably competent
practitioner in the same class to which he belongs, acting in
the same or similar circumstances." 10 6 When the physician is
charged with making an improper judgment, however, the rea-
sonableness of the decision must be viewed in light of facts
known to him at the time he made the decision. 107 Nothing in
the Mackey opinion indicates that the surgery or acts after
cardiac arrest were improvidently performed; therefore, any
dereliction would be in the physicians' not learning of the
plaintiff's medical history.
The court first noted that "the question of negligence of
the treating physicians and the hospital is closely related to
the question of contributory negligence of Mrs. Clark in giving
an incomplete or inaccurate history."10 8 If the physician's elic-
itation of medical history does not comport to the standard of
ordinary care, the patient is contributorily negligent if he
knows the physician is unaware of a condition or of prior
treatment that poses a risk of danger to the patient and if his
failure to so inform the physician is unreasonable under the
circumstances.10 9 The patient, however, has no duty to be
aware that some historical fact might subject him to risk; the
patient is allowed to rely on the physician to inquire as to
material facts.110 Then if the physician, in taking the medical
105 Id. at 252.
106 Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970).
107 587 S.W.2d at 254.
108 Id.




history, comports with standard medical practice, there is no
basis for liability.
In dicta, the court explored circumstances under which
failure to relay medical history may not bar recovery. The
court was particularly concerned with situations in which the
physician had actual knowledge of the facts not disclosed or
should have discovered the facts independent of the medical
history.111 It should be recognized that if the physician was
negligent in not discovering historical facts, he will be charged
with knowledge of the same constructively, and the question
thus becomes whether a reasonably prudent physician could
have come to the same conclusion as did the defendant.
- If the physician has actual knowledge of the crucial fact,
the plaintiff's conduct is immaterial because no causal connec-
tion between plaintiff's negligence and the physician's conduct
exists. Where the physician should have discovered the fact
through independent means, however, the plaintiff's negli-
gence can be material, although a causal connection between
the plaintiff's negligence and the injury must be shown. Thus,
if causation is the dispositive issue, the question is whether
the patient's negligence was a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm." 2 In the situation here, the patient's negli-
gence clearly appears to have been a direct cause of the harm,
concurring with any independent negligence of the physician.
The court thus upheld a verdict for the defendants.
The fact that the patient's negligence is a substantial fac-
tor in causing the harm, however, does not require a finding
that the negligence is the legal cause of the harm if there is a
"rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the
manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm." '13
Thus, if a court desires to relieve a patient of his negligence, it
can be done under such a rule. On this issue the Mackey court
referred to Southeastern Kentucky Baptist Hospital, Inc. v.
Bruce,14 stating that Bruce "suggests that a patient's contrib-
utory negligence in giving a history may not be a bar to recov-
"Id. at 256.
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 465 (1965).
13 Id. at § 431(b).
14 539 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. 1976).
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ery in all cases."' 1 5 Unfortunately, the case does not suggest
such a rule.
In Bruce, a thyroidectomy was performed on the wrong
patient. Apparently the patient had answered to the wrong
name, and the medical staff did not check the identification
bracelet on the patient's wrist or make any effort to otherwise
ascertain the patient's identity. The fallacy in the court's
analogy of the two situations is that the patient in Bruce was
not negligent."' Thus Bruce provides no support for the rule
suggested by the Mackey court, and if such a rule is to be
adopted in some future case the court will have to create it
therein.
587 S.W.2d at 256.
116 The Bruce Court made this point clear when it stated: The appellants
insist that Gladys was remiss in her duties, in that for some unaccountable
reason she answered to the name of Smith. However, this Court does not
consider this to be the neglect of a duty required of Gladys. After all, she
was being removed to the operating room for surgery and at the best
would have been in a somewhat confused condition. An even more critical
duty was placed upon the doctor, Bryant, and Wyatt in establishing with
absolute certainty the identity of a surgical patient.
539 S.W.2d at 287 (emphasis added).
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